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The 2002 Food Security Act brought about historic change in the U.S. approach to
regulating peanut markets.  Most conspicuously, it brought an end to the decades-olds system of
supply control through marketing quota, thus ending the similarity between the U.S. peanut and
tobacco programs.  
We analyze the effects of these historic changes.
II. An Historical Review of the Peanut Program
II.A. 1934-1996 
1
The peanut program originated from the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, taking
effect when peanuts were designated a basic commodity in 1934.  Under the Act, contracts were
made with producers to reduce their acreage in return for a payment.   Regional growers’
associations were formed in 1937, which purchased specified quantities of peanuts at
government-set support prices.  Purchased peanuts were diverted to crush purposes (manufacture
of oil and meal) and away from the market for edible peanuts.  Neither effort, acreage reduction
nor product diversion, were successful due to quick expansion of the industry and attendant
reduction in the price of peanuts.
After the failure of the voluntary measures in the 1933 Act, a mandatory program was
established in 1941.  Individual acreage allotments were set, in the aggregate, at 1.9 million acres
and penalties were applied to farmers who produced on additional acres.  During World War II,2  Since 1977, the aggregate quota has been set yearly to meet the demand in the edible
market.  Historically, there have been many changes in the farm distribution of quota.   Prior to
1978, all peanuts produced on acreage allotments received the support price.  From 1978 to
1981, poundage quota was determined by multiplying the farm’s historical base production by
the ratio of the state’s quota allotment to the state’s historical base production.  From 1986 to
2
however, compliance with the program was not enforced and plantings quickly expanded to 3.4
million acres.  After World War II, the Agricultural Act of 1949 established support prices for
peanuts and other commodities between 75 and 90 percent of then-current levels.  Between 1949
and 1978 all peanuts from approved allotments were guaranteed the support price and the
program ran into similar difficulties as in its beginnings.  New peanut varieties and farming
techniques were introduced and per-acre yields grew, increasing dramatically the costs of the
program.  
Beginning in 1978, producers received the support price only on quota peanuts, where
quota was set annually in poundage terms to meet the expected edible market demand.  During
the 1978-1982 period, farmers were required to own both poundage quota and acreage
allotments, but in 1982 acreage allotments were abandoned.  This was an important change to the
program because while the support price continued to be paid only on quota peanuts, there now
was no limit to total domestic production.  Before 1977, all harvested peanuts were sold either
directly to the edible market or placed under loan with the Commodity Credit Corporation
(CCC).  In either case, growers received at least the edible support price.  Now under the new
1977 program, growers that grew more than their quota had two options.   First, they could make
a contract with a handler for export or sale in the crush market.  Second, they could place their
peanuts under loan with the area grower association.  In both cases, peanuts beyond quota
received a price well below the support price.
21990 increases in quota were distributed equally among all farms that either had quota in the
previous year or had produced peanuts in at least two out of three previous years.  After 1991,
increases in quota were distributed proportionally among all quota holders in the state according
to their total production rather than equally among all producers.  In the event that producers
failed to meet their quota, they were allowed to carry the unproduced quantity, so called
carryovers, into the next growing season.  Total national carry-overs could not exceed 10 percent
of the national quota.  If the 10 percent limit was met, producers whose individual
undermarketings exceeded this limit had to wait until the next growing season to transfer their
carryovers.  In order to carry over under-marketings, the producer had to show an intent to
produce his quota.  The Secretary of Agriculture had the right to reduce the quota to a producer
if in the last three growing seasons the quota was not met at least twice.  Weather and natural
disasters were allowable exceptions to this rule.  In these cases, farmers did not need to produce
their quota but only needed to show that they planted enough to meet their quota based on their
historical yields.  In the event that a grower’s quota was reduced, the lost quota was then
redistributed among all producers in the state.  
3The peanut program was accused of  placing barriers to trade and unfairly protecting of
peanut farmers from international competition.
3
From 1978 to 1996, quota could be leased or sold only within county boundaries, but
there were two exceptions to this rule.  The first involved a producer who was farming in two
contiguous counties.  Under this special condition, the farmer could transfer the quota located on
the farm in one county to the part of the farm that was located in another county.  Second, states
with very small allotments of quota were allowed to trade quota within the state without
restrictions.  
  After the approval of NAFTA and GATT in the fall of 1993 the peanut program came
under considerable pressure.
3  Many members of Congress called for substantial changes in the
program or for its complete elimination.  Such pressure led to the 1996 Farm Bill peanut
program revision.4See Congressional Research Service Report IB95118 - Peanuts: Policy Issues.
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II.B. The 1996 Farm Bill (FAIR Act) Peanut Program Revision
The 1996 omnibus farm bill extended the life of the peanut program for seven years.  
The stated goal of the bill in regards to peanuts was to guarantee stable income to peanut
producers and to ensure an ample supply for the domestic market.  As before 1996, this was to
be accomplished through a two-level price support system and a ban on imports.  However,
during the 1995/1996 farm bill debate, the issue of mounting costs was raised and participants
suggested making changes such that the program would operate at no net cost to the government. 
Peanut program proponents argued that the program significantly supported rural communities
and that its structure should be maintained.  Arrayed on the other side, peanut shellers and
manufacturers recommended a significant reduction in quota support prices and even elimination
of the program.  Each group argued that the change it suggested was vital to the survival of
peanut industry in the long run and was needed to reverse declining consumer demand for peanut
products.
House and Senate debates over the bill were intense.
4  The key issues included the cost of
the program, an oversupply of quota peanuts in recent years, the ban on imports, and the high
domestic price compared to the world price.  (In 1996, the support price for peanuts was $670
per ton, while the world price was near $350 per ton.)  House floor action in 1996 passed a
House Agriculture Committee proposal to modify the existing program by a vote of 212 - 209. 
The final law that was agreed on by the House and Senate resulted in several important changes. 
The support price for peanuts was lowered for the first time in history.  The support price was
reduced by 10 percent to $610 and the peanut program was extended through the 2002 crop5
season only.  Several factors that had increased the cost of program were eliminated.  For
example, the new Farm Bill did not allow for the price support to increase at the same rate as the
cost of production, which had been increasing up to five percent per year.  Under the new
program, the aggregate quota was to be set to reflect the domestic demand for edible peanuts. 
This stood in contrast to the 1990 Farm Bill, which guaranteed a floor of 1.35 million tons of
quota peanuts to be bought at the support price.  Undermarketings, which allowed transfers of
unused quota to the next planting season were eliminated.  Leases and sales of peanut quota
across county lines were allowed but quota still could not be transferred across state lines.
Peanut program opponents pushed for further changes to the program after 1996.  In July
1998 during floor debate on agriculture appropriations measure, the house rejected (181-244) an
amendment that would further lower the quota loan rate to $550.  In 1999 and 2000, the divide
between growers and manufacturers grew deeper.
II.C. The Farm Security Act of 2002
The 2002 farm bill made historic changes to the program such that the program now
more closely resembles those for other crops.  The key provisions comprise fixed decoupled
payments, counter cyclical payments, and a marketing loan.  Most strikingly, the Act terminates
the poundage quota for peanuts and compensates quota holders for the loss of their asset.  The
following subsections describe the changes in detail. 
II.C.1.   Fixed Decoupled Payments and Counter Cyclical Payments
Fixed decoupled payments and counter cyclical payments are based on eligible payment
yield and eligible peanut acres for peanut farms and not on production.  Thuse, they are
decoupled payments.  Payment yields and acres, the basis for the decoupled payments, are based5  Payment yield and acres are determined according to the following rules.  First,
payment yield for peanuts on the farm is determined as the average yield for the 1998 through
2001 crop years, excluding any crop year in which acreage planted to peanuts was zero.  Second,
average peanut acres for the farm planted to peanuts are calculated for the 1998 through 2001
crop years.  Payment acres for peanuts on a farm are equal to 85% of the peanut acres for the
farm.  Fixed decoupled payments are to be made to all eligible producers for each of the 2002
through 2011 crop years at a payment rate of $36 per ton.  The amount of the fixed decoupled
payment is equal to the product of the payment rate, payment acres, and payment yield.  Fixed
decoupled payments must be paid no later than September 30 of the fiscal year.  A producer may
receive up to 50 % of the fixed decoupled payment in advance anytime after December 1 of a
fiscal year.
6
on a farmer’s history of peanut plantings and production between 1998 and 2001.
5 
Counter-cyclical payments are paid whenever the effective price for peanuts is less than
the target price.  The effective price is equal to the sum of (1) the higher of the national average
market price during the 12-month marketing year for peanuts and the national average loan rate
for peanuts, and (2) the payment rate for fixed decoupled payments for peanuts.  Notice that the
price a farmer actually receives for his peanuts is not the relevant price in determining the
counter-cyclical payment. Thus, a grower could receive an unusually high price for his peanuts
and still receive a counter-cyclical payment if the national market average price were low.  The
target price for peanuts is set at $495 per ton.  The payment rate for counter-cyclical payments is
equal to the difference between the target price and the effective price for the commodity
(defined above).  The payment amount for the counter-cyclical payments is the product of the
payment rate, the payment acres and the payment yield.  Partial payment of the counter-cyclical
payment can be provided in advance six months into the marketing year for the crop.  
II.C.2.  Marketing Assistance Loans and Loan Deficiency Payments 
Under the new Act, production on a farm for each of the 2002 through 2011 crops of
peanuts.  The loan rate for a marketing assistance loan for peanuts is set at $355 per ton.  The7
Secretary of Agriculture will permit producers to repay a marketing assistance loan at a rate that
is the lesser of the loan rate for the commodity, plus interest, or a rate that the Secretary
determines will minimize forfeitures, accumulation of stock, storage cost, and allow peanuts to
be marketed freely and competitively.
The Secretary of Agriculture may make loan deficiency payments available to producers,
who, although eligible to obtain a marketing assistance loan for peanuts, agree to forego
obtaining the loan in return for payment.  A loan deficiency payment rate is the difference
between the loan repayment rate, and the loan rate.  Loan deficiency payments (LDPs) are based
on actual production which can give incentives to peanut farmers to increase their production.  
In contrast to LDPs, decoupled payments are based on historical yields and plantings.
II.C.3. The Termination of the Marketing Quota Program for Peanuts and
Compensation to  Peanut Quota Holders For Loss of Quota Asset Value
A feature unique to peanuts in the 2002 FSA is the buying out of the marketing quota
created in 1978.  The Secretary of Agriculture will make payments to eligible quota holders to
compensate them for the lost value of the quota caused by the elimination of the marketing quota
program for peanuts during fiscal years 2002 through 2006.  The payments will be provided in
five equal installments not later than September 30 of each fiscal year.  The amount of the
payment to a peanut quota holder is calculated as the product of $0.11 per pound and the actual
farm poundage quota of the quota holder for the 2001 marketing year excluding seed and
experimental peanuts.  A quota owner can also opt to take the undiscounted sum of all of the
payments in the first year. 8
III. The Effects of the 2002 Farm Security Act on Peanut Markets
In this section we consider how the 2002 changes in the U.S. peanut program can be
expected to influence world peanut markets.  We then consider the distribution of the effects of
peanut program changes across producing states.
III.A. Effects on World Markets
III.A.1 A Model without Regulatory Errors–
   World Peanut Price Rises when the Peanut Program is Eliminated
Rucker and Thurman (1990) analyze the effects of the peanut program on the domestic
and foreign edible markets.  They model the program under several assumptions: peanuts are
used in two separate markets, edible and crush; foreign producers grow both edible and crush
grade peanuts and their prices are exogenous to domestic markets; imports for edible peanuts are
prohibited, but exports of U.S. edible peanuts are not restricted; no restrictions on imports and
exports of crush peanuts exist.  Most significant here is the assumption that the United States is
small in the world peanut market, implying that changes in the U.S. peanut program will have no
world price effects.  After presenting the Rucker and Thurman model, we will relax the small
country assumption to analyze what world price effects might be.  
The aggregate effects of the peanut program are shown in figure 1.a.  Policy makers are
assumed to set aggregate marketing quota for the year at Qq units, which is exactly the amount
demanded at the support price, Ps.  This we refer to as the absence of regulatory errors.  The
domestic quantity supplied at world price Pw is Qs and there are Qs-Qq units exported.  Quantity
Qc crush grade peanuts will be demanded by the crush market at price Pc.  Because all peanuts
produced domestically are of edible grade this quantity will be imported to the U.S. from abroad. 
It is assumed that the crush and edible demands are unaffected by each other’s prices.9
Figure 1.b shows a more realistic, and typical, situation where marketing quota
underestimates the domestic demand.  The Qq units of marketing quota, set by policy makers, is
less than QD, the edible quantity demanded at the support price Ps.  Quantity QB = QD - Qq are
bought back from CCC pools to the edible domestic market.   Quantity, QE = QS - QD, will be
exported.  In the domestic edible market, buybacks simply serve to fix the supply at quantity
demanded at the support price.  The effects of buybacks on the crush and export market are more
complicated.  
Additionals in general can be contracted for sale into the export market or they can be
placed with CCC growers association pools.  Participants in the pool receive profits from the
pool in proportion to their contribution.  The price received for pool peanuts depends on the



















where P represent the average price from the pool, Q
B is the quantity of peanuts bought back into
the edible market, and Q
C is the quantity of peanuts crushed.  P
S and P
C represent the support
price and crush price, both exogenous.  
Figure 2 shows how the average pool price received depends on placements in the
additionals pool.  The average pool price received is decreasing with the quantity of peanuts
placed in the pool for placements beyond QB (the exogenous quantity bought back into the edible
market).  Rucker and Thurman (1990) argue that peanut producers will place peanuts in the pool
until the pool price received is equal to the world price, P = P
W.  This implies that the10
equilibrium CCC pool price received is equal to both the marginal cost of production and the
world price for edible peanuts, P
W, and therefore peanut producers are indifferent between
selling their peanuts on the world market or placing them in the pool.  For any given quantity of
additionals sold on the domestic edible and crush market, the P* curve shows the price that
domestic producers receive for peanuts placed in CCC pools.  Therefore, P* can be viewed can
be viewed as a domestic demand curve from the pools for edible peanuts.  The elimination of
quota and the additionals pools carries with it the elimination of this source of domestic demand
for peanuts, hence, the possibility of a reduction in world price due to the 2002 FSA changes.
The following section advances the Rucker and Thurman model and analyzes the effects
of peanut program modifications on the world price.  First the effect of the program are analyzed
assuming no errors by policy makers and assuming away the CCC pools.  These complexities are
introduced afterwards.
Figure 3 depicts equilibrium in the domestic, export and foreign markets with and
without the peanut program.  Policy makers make no mistake in estimating quantity demanded
on the domestic market: quantity demanded, Q
D, is equal to the marketing quota, Qq, at the
support price, PS.  If the world price is below Pq there will not be any export of edible peanuts
observed and the entire quantity produced will be suppled to the domestic market where it will
be purchased at the support price, PS.  When the world price exceeds Pq, U.S. producers will
contract for export.  The supply of peanuts for export under the peanut program, Sx
w/P.P. is
depicted in figure 3.b. 
Figure 3.b also shows the U.S. supply of exports absent the peanut program.  As shown,
without the peanut program, edible peanuts will be imported to the U.S. when the equilibrium11
price is below P
A and exported to the foreign markets when the price is above.  Figure 3.c shows
equilibrium in the world market.  Demand and supply of edible peanuts from the rest of the
world are labeled as D
ROW and S
ROW.  Under the peanut program the aggregate supply curve,
, is the horizontal sum of S
ROW and Sx
w/P.P. and Qw
w / P.P. of edible peanuts are demanded at S
ROW%US
w / P.P
the equilibrium world price, Pw
w / P.P..  When the current version of the peanut program is
eliminated, a new total supply curve,  , is created by rotating the world supply curve, S
ROW%US
w / out P.P.
S
ROW, around the point where no U.S. export and imports occur.  This can also be viewed as a
rotation of   about the point where price equals PS.  This is an upward shift of supply in S
ROW%US
w / P.P.
the relevant range and when the program is removed the world price will necessarily increase
from 
   to  P
ROW%US
w / P.P. P
ROW%US
w / out P.P.
Intuitively, the elimination of the U.S. peanut program results in an expansion in world
demand for peanuts.  Domestic consumers were prevented from buying at the world price; their
consumption was restricted to that demanded at the high domestic support price.  Allowing
domestic consumers access to the world market, then, necessarily increases demand and
equilibrium world price.
An algebraic model of the effects of peanut program elimination, parallel to figure 3,
allows quantitative analysis of the world price effects.  The model presented here assumes that
the marketing quota equals quantity demanded at the support price and ignores the grower
association pools.  Both assumptions are relaxed in the following section.   Equilibrium
conditions as depicted in figure 3 without the peanut program and with the peanut program are as12
follows:
(2) without the program:  SP DP D P D P S P
US US EXP ROW ROW () () () () () ,
11 1 1 1 −= = −
(3) with the program:  
00 0 0 () ( ) () () () .
US US SUP EXP ROW ROW SP DP D P D P S P −= =−
Subtracting equation (2) from (3) yields:
(4)
10 1 1 0 () () [ () ( ) ] () () .
US US US US SUP EXP EXP SP SP DP DP D P D P −− − = −
Parameterizing the change in terms of demand, export and supply elasticities yields:

























































































































εη η6  The domestic demand elasticity is estimated in Rucker and Thurman (1990) at .20.  The
share of current U.S. production accounted for by quota, α, is set equal to 0.66.
13


































Equation (9) reveals that the percentage change in the world price depends on the known



























6 and price change.  Note that all elasticities are defined to be
positive.  The level curves confirm the graphical analysis: eliminating the program can result
only in positive price changes, ranging from 5% to 30% along the labeled curves.  Further %∆P









percentage change in price is near 10 %.  14
III.A.2. A Model with Regulatory Errors and Grower Association Pools–
 World Peanut Price Can Either Rise or Fall with Program Elimination
Figure 5 augments the previous model by allowing for underestimation of the domestic
quantity demanded at the support price and for the existence of grower association pools. 
Rucker and Thurman (1990) argue that policy makers display a consistent bias in the setting of
quota levels so as to ensure that government purchases and expenses are zero.  As discussed
there and illustrated in figure 2, the domestic demand curve for peanuts under this scenario
becomes inherently nonlinear, as depicted in figure 5.a.  The slope of the demand curve D
US
w / P.P.
becomes less steep as the underestimation of domestic demand at support price by policy makers
becomes more severe.   For prices above P
2, Q
q is equal to the marketing quota set by policy
makers.  Because the domestic demand at the support price is underestimated, Q
B units of edible
peanuts are bought back into the market from the pools, while quantity Q
c is crushed and
quantity Q
1 is exported.  If the price initially were below P
2, the quantity of peanuts demanded
would be greater than the quantity supplied and the price would be bid up to P
2 .  No exports of
edible peanuts occur for prices below P
2 as can be seen in figure 5.b.  For prices above P
2, U.S.
exports are equal to the difference between S
US and   D
US
w / P.P.
As before, panel c of figure 5 analyzes equilibrium in the world market.  The supply
curve,  , is the horizontal summation of   and S
ROW and the  supply curve without S
ROW%US
w / P.P. S
X
w / P.P.
the peanut program,  , is created by rotating the world supply curve around point where S
ROW%US
w/outP.P.
no U.S. imports or exports occur.  In figure 5.c the elimination of the peanut program is shown to
increase the price of edible peanuts, however, this result does not hold in general.  The world7Buybacks to the edible market were estimated at about 10% of effective quota in 1999
crop season.
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price can either increase or decrease.  
The world price of edible peanuts after program elimination will go down if supply and
demand curves S
US and D
US without the peanut program intersect below the intersection of S
US
and    In order for this to happen, two conditions must hold.  First, domestic demand needs D
US
w / P.P.
to be quite inelastic.  Second, the reduction in U.S. export supply caused by the diversion of pool
peanuts into the crush market must be large.  In order to examine the reasonableness of the
inelasticity of domestic demand under the program,  was simulated based on equation (1) D
US
w / P.P.
and the 1999 crop year marketing quota and buybacks to the edible market.
7  The result of this
simulation is presented in figure 6.  The resulting demand curve is initially extremely steep
making it very difficult for the intersection of S
US and D
US to happen below the intersection of
S
US and     As depicted if figure 7, however, it could still happen for demand elasticities in D
US
w / P.P.
the neighborhood of zero.  
In sum, grower association pools for additionals need to be considered in order to be able
to correctly predict changes in the equilibrium world price without the peanut program.  On the
one hand, the current peanut program increases the supply of U.S. peanuts for export by
maintaining the support price and marketing quota provisions.  On the other hand, the supply of
peanuts for export is decreased by the program because peanut producers are given incentives to8Depending on buybacks to the edible market, some peanuts in the pool are crushed for
oil and meal.
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place their peanuts into growers association pools and therefore, the domestic crush market.
8 
The net effect of these two forces is not clear and could either increase or decrease the quantity
of peanuts exported.  
The algebraic version of figure 6 and 7 can help to resolve the ambisuous effect on world
prices.  Here we assume, following Rucker and Thurman (1990), that regulators underestimate
the domestic demand, and so quantity supplied is set equal to quantity demanded at the support
price through buybacks from grower association pools.  Equilibrium conditions as depicted in
figures 5 and 7 without the peanut program and with the peanut program are as follows:
(10) without the program:  
11 1 1 1 () () () () () ,
US US EXP ROW ROW SP DP D P D P S P −= = −
(11) with the program:        
00 0 0 0 () ( ( ) () ) () () () .
US US SUP C EXP ROW ROW SP DP Q P D P D P S P −+ = = −
Subtracting (11) from (10) yields:
(12)SP SP DP DP Q P D P D P
US US US US S C EXP EXP () () () () () () () .
10 1 0 1 0 −−+ += −



















B is the quantity of peanuts from the pool bought back to the edible market at the support
price P
S and Q
C is the quantity of peanuts from the pool used in the crush market.  The quantity
of crushed peanuts, Q












Substituting (14) into (12) yields:
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and substituting (1) into (15) yields:
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EXP C S EXP
εη
η
() () () ()
() () (),
10 0 0 0 0 1
00 1 0 0
0
−− − − −
+− = − − −
or:
(18) .
0S 0 C U S U S0 E X PE X P S 0 B
Dq S S D 0 1
0 C S US 0 EXP EXP 0 US
SS D 0 Dq
P P [(P P )(h Q e Q h Q ) (P P )Q ]
P
(P P )[P (e Q h Q ) P h Q ]
−+ + − −
=
−+ +
The percentage change in price due to program elimination is then:
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0η ]9The distribution of costs and benefits to individuals depends upon whether a quota
owner is also a producer.  This analyses employ the representative peanut producer approach.  It
is assumed that the representative producer kept his production unchanged after the enactment of
the new farm bill.     
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The last expression for %∆P, equation (19), can be calculated for given values of the domestic
demand elasticity and for various values of export and supply elasticities.  Figures 8 and 9 show





The domestic demand elasticity,  , was set to 0.2 in figure 8 and 0.4 in figure 9 to assess the η
US
D







and are decreasing in export demand elasticity,  .  Notice, that the price change in figure 8 is η
EXP
D





conclusion enforces the result from figures 5 and 7 indicating that the world price could either
decrease or increase depending on the elasticity of domestic demand.  
III.B. The Distribution Across States of the Benefits of Reform
9
Consider two peanut producing states.  One, depicted in figure 10.a, produces small
amounts of additionals relative to its marketing quota; the other produces large amounts of
additionals depicted in figure 10.b.  Assuming that the proposed target price will be greater than
the current world price, PW, but lower than the current support price, PS, the incurred loss to the
quota holders due to the marketing quota elimination will be rectangle PsABPw depicted in both
figure 10.a and 10.b.  (We ignore momentarily the explicit compensation due to the quota
buyout.)  Because the target price, PT, which will be paid to past producers on 85 percent of the10Note that part of the area PsABPw lost by the quota owner is gained by the land owner
therefore redistributing the wealth from one group to the other.
11 It is important to note that there is an alternative way to measure the effects on
quota owners.  In the text we present calculations that compare the annual flow of benefits of the
former program (the difference between support and world prices) with the annualized flow of
benefits from the quota buyout.  Both are treated as perpetuities.  This procedure compares the
2002 program to a quota program that would have lasted forever.  Clearly, no one in 2001
thought that the program would last forever and with probability one.  This claim is supported by
19
product of their average yield and average acres planted between 1998 and 2001 is greater than
the world price, PW, land owners will gain rectangle PTCDPw also depicted in both figure 10.a
and 10.b.
10  Depending on the production of additionals between 1998 and 2001, the change in
the policy will affect peanut producing states differently.  The largest loss will be seen in states
that underproduced their quota or produced small amounts of additionals.  Peanut states with
large production of additionals will be affected less severely and in some cases rectangle
PTCDPw could be larger than rectangle PsABPw signaling a gain due to the elimination of
marketing quota and the setting up of a new subsidy program.  
The total gain to a representative peanut quota owner and landowner can be calculated as
the difference between rectangles PTCDPw and PsABPw plus the compensation to quota holders
for their asset loss.  Payments from the government to quota holders will be awarded in five
instalments and therefore its present value can be calculated as follows:
(20)   
Payment Value













where r represents the nominal interest rate.
11  If the quota holder decided to invest the paymentquota sales prices that were much less than the value of a perpetual flow of quota lease rates.  In
recent years, quota sales prices have been near four times the annual lease rate, which we
interpret as the market's belief that the program might end soon.  (If one were discounting a
perpetual flow by dividing by a discount rate, a sales price four times the lease rate implies a
25% annual discount rate–a rate that is so high that it must reflect uncertainty over the program's
continuance.)  Therefore, it would be reasonable to argue that quota holders did not lose the full
present value of a perpetual stream of lease rates in 2002; rather, they only lost what quota had
sold for prior to the 2002 changes.  From this capital asset point of view, the 55 cent buyout rate
should be compared to the sales price of quota, which in some counties was as high as 55 cents
prior to the 2002 Act, but in many was closer to 30 cents. 
Both perspectives, the perpetual flow and asset view, can be defended.  They differ in
their selection of the relevant base for comparison.  The perpetual flow view in the text measures
the economic changes to quota owners relative to a program that would have lasted forever–the
status quo in perpetuity.  The asset view would measure the change relative to a program that
was widely thought to be politically vulnerable.  While this latter view is a reasonable and
historically accurate one, it leaves uncounted any capital losses in recent years that may have
accrued as market participants discounted quota value when the program's revision became more
certain.  We note here that the perpetual flow view in the text understates the benefits to quota
owners from the 2002 changes as compared to the asset view.  Finally, another way in which the
text might be said to understate the benefits to quota owners is that it measures the annual returns
from quota ownership as the full difference between support price and world price.  An
alternative measure would be observed quota lease rates, which in many counties was
significantly less than the full difference between the two prices.
20
earning the nominal interest rate on his investment, his yearly sustainable interest income would
be:
(21)   Interest Income r* Payment Present Value, =
and the total yearly gain or loss to a quota-owning peanut farmer due to the peanut program’s
elimination can be written as:
(22)
Yearly Income Quota Owner Loss
Landowner Gain Interest Income
= +
+ .
  Table 1 displays empirical measures under this scenario in the new farm bill which sets21
the target price, PT, for edible peanuts at $495.  The world price of peanuts is assumed to be
fixed at $355 and the nominal interest rate r is equal to 0.05.  Table 1 presents the impact of the
farm bill on peanut producing states.  The U.S. peanut quota holders will lose $332 million and
the loss ranges between $15 million in Florida and $135 million in Georgia. The gain to the U.S.
landowners due to the additionals sales price set at $495 is estimated at $246 million and ranges
between $11 million in Oklahoma and $88 million in Georgia.  The U.S. quota holders will
receive $64 million.  The combined loss or gain from the elimination of marketing quota and
increased additionals peanuts sales price would range from a loss of $4,759 per farm per year in
Oklahoma to a loss of $1,448 in Georgia per farm per year.  Florida and Texas would gain
$1,733 and $7,987 per farm per year.  In aggregate,  U.S. farmers would lose $712 per farm per
year under the new bill.  22
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Table 1: Average Effective Quota, Average Total Production, Gains and Losses under the Final
Version of the Farm Bill




























Alabama 343,260 387,411 -44,624 23,874 8,583 -2,349
Florida 113,015 256,270 -14,692 15,793 2,826 1,733
Georgia 1,041,198 1,420,244 -135,356 87,523 26,033 -2,001
North
Carolina
279,618 346,989 -36,350 21,383 6,991 -1,448
Oklahoma 168,351 182,867 -21,886 11,269 4,209 -4,759
Texas 356,404 1,102,383 -46,332 67,934 8,911 7,987
Virginia 197,823 219,458 -25,717 13,524 4,946 -2,631
U.S. 2,555,308 3,986,626 -332,190 245,676 63,890 -712
Key:
1 Average effective Quota and Average Total Production are average of 1998 through 2000 production
years
2 The Target Price under the final version of Farm Bill is $495  per ton
3 The payment rates for quota buyout is 0.11 cents/lb under the final version of the Farm Bill-25-
Figure 1: Domestic Supply and Demand for Edible Peanuts-26-
Figure 2: Average Pool Price, Quantity of Buybacks and Edible Peanuts Crushed  27
































Figure 4: Price Effects of Peanut Program Elimination 
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Figure 6: Domestic Demand for Edible Peanuts (simulation)
    
31 
Figure 7: Equilibrium in the Domestic, Export and Foreign Markets – Errors in Policy, Presence of Grower Association Pools 




Figure 8: Price Effects of Peanut Program Elimination - Model with Policy Errors and Grower Association Pools, 
                Lower Demand Elasticity
    
Note: Demand elasticity is set equal to 0.2-33-
Figure 9: Price Effects of Peanut Program Elimination - Model with Policy Errors and Grower Association Pools,
                Higher Demand Elasticity





















Figure 10: Gaines and Losses to Peanut Farmers under New Farm Bill, County producing        
Small and Large Amount of Additionals